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Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the dynamic relationship between corruption, investment 
and economic growth in Tunisia within a multivariate framework. In the empirical section we 
use data span from 1976 to 2013 and we perform a vector error correction model and 
cointegartion technique to detect causality between corruption, investment, economic growth, 
credit to the private sector and foreign direct investment. The main findings of this paper show 
that corruption hampered Tunisia economic growth in the short-run and the long run as well. 
Corruption could be the main reason of the slowdown of investment activities and the low inflow 
of capital. Another important conclusion was revealed in this paper is that corruption get 
worsened in the period that follows the social upsurge of December 2010. Therefore, the main 
goals of the so called “revolution” are from being achieved yet. Hence, more works are needed to 
fight corruption in Tunisia.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Corruption is one of the major problems facing societies around the world. There are various 
definitions of corruption that evolved over the time by economists since the 60s. According to 
Nye (1967), corruption as “the behavior which deviates from formal duties of a public rule 
because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains: or 
violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence.” For Nye 
(1967) corruption is the deviation from the duties of a formal public role for private gain.  
In another definition, Macrae (1982) has used the term arrangement to define corruption.  For 
him corruption is an “arrangement that involves a private exchange between two parties (the 
demander and the supplier)”. The arrangement has an influence on the allocation of resources, 
either immediately or in the future, and involves the use or abuse of public or collective 
responsibility for private ends. According to Macrae (1982), there is an expectation of a net gain 
for the both parties from an arrangement concluded. According to the author, the most probably 
form of arrangement between private individual and public official is the monetary form.  
Gould (1991) define corruption as a moral problem, it is “an immoral and unethical phenomenon 
that contains a set of moral aberrations from moral standards of society, causing loss of respect 
for and confidence in duly constituted authority”.  Shleifer and Vishny (1993) define government 
corruption as “the sale by government officials of government property for personal gain”. They 
present the collect of bribes by government officials as an example of government corruption. 
Daniel Kaufmann (1997) defines corruption as “the misuse of public office for private gain”.  He 
is followed by many authors who attribute the same definition to the concept of corruption. 
(Treisman (2000), Sandholtz and Koetzle (2003)). Aidt (2003) defines “corruption is an act in 
which the power of public office is used for personal gain in a manner that contravenes the rules 
of the game.”  De Jong and Udo (2006) defined corruption as “the misuse of public power for 
private benefit (or much alike).” Misuse would be deviating from the formal duties of a public 
role or a code of conduct. In the context of international trade, corruption would most often take 
the form of bribery.  Corrupt officers extort bribes from a client, who otherwise will not receive 
assured services, or will receive inferior service. Therefore, businesses and individuals may 
collude with customs officers to lower customs duties, speed up service or restrict competitors. 
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The World Bank (WB) defined corruption as “the single greatest obstacle to economic and social 
development. It undermines development by distorting the rule of law and weakening the 
institutional on which economic growth depends.”   
 
There are various indicators and indices that measure corruption. For example, The Business 
International (BI) publishes indices on 56 “country risk” factors for 68 countries, for the period 
1980-1983, and on 30 country risk factors for 57 countries, for the period 1971-1979. The 
Business International indices are between 0 and 10 and a high value of the index means that the 
country in question has “good” institutions (see Mauro 1995). Another database provided by 
International Transparency (IT) to measure the corruption perception index (CPI) and then ranks 
countries according to the extent by which corruption is believed to exist. Another important 
database of corruption is provided by the International Country Risk Guide (IRCG) which rates 
140 countries each month on the basis of over 40 risk metrics affecting political, economic 
and financial risk, dating back to 1984 for most. The ICRG corruption index varies from 0 to 6, 
with higher values indicating higher corruption. Literature has used these indices to investigate 
the effects of corruption on economic growth and development using single country study or a 
group of countries and regions. For instance, literature on corruption and growth versus is vast. 
However, the empirical results provide conflicting results. In fact while corruption appears to 
affect growth for some countries, it does not have ant effects for other countries.  Therefore, the 
main purpose of this paper is to investigate the consequences of corruption on Tunisia economy.  
 
Tunisia is an interesting case study. In fact, Tunisia has witnessed buoyant economic growth 
during the nineties following the adoption of several and various structural reforms. The most 
important reform was the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) of late eighties. Moreover, 
Tunisia ratified and signed the most important international conventions relating to most 
important economic activities such as: the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 
henceforth) in 1989 and to the World Trade Organization (WTO henceforth) in 1994 and the 
signature of multiple accords with the European Union in 1995 followed later, from 2004 to 
2005, by the Neighborhood Agreement. These ratifications have considerably boosted up the 
local economy.  
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During the 2000s, Tunisia recorded buoyant economic performances with an average growth rate 
moving between 4% and 5% per annum and Tunisia was frequently top ranked by international 
organization, notably the World Bank and IMF, in terms of competitiveness. Furthermore, 
Tunisia was considered as a model for Arab and developing countries as well. The economic and 
political stability encouraged foreign investors to invest in Tunisia. It recorded a doubling of the 
FDI crossing from 402, 9 M TND in 1997 to 1015.7 M TND in 2005 with a positive growth rate 
of 152 %. The report of FDI in Tunisia indicates that the number of foreign companies crossed 
form 2803 in 2006 to 2966 in 2008 to reach 3135 in 2010.   
 
Despite, the outstanding performance of Tunisia economy, several problems persist and some 
issues get worsened.  The most important problem is the increase of disparity between the 
regions which in turn created socio-economic unbalances. The regional disparities are stressed in 
Tunisia by the concentration of public services, investments and economic activities in the 
coastal region. Consequently, the internal regions have been less served in terms of public 
services including health, education, telecommunication, etc. Jendouba, for example, is the least 
governorate in terms of primary health care, with 1,4 general practitioner (family doctor) for 10 
000 capita, and less than 1,7 for Sidi Bouzid, Medenine and Gafsa, against a national average of 
2,7, whereas in the metropolis of Tunis, the rate is 4,3 (ADB, 2012 ). The regional disparities 
have created several economic, politic and social problems including: increase of poverty, rise of 
unemployment, migration from marginalized regions to Tunis metropolitan and coastal cities, 
escalation of tensions between regions, discrimination etc.  For example, unemployment rate1 in 
2013 was above 20 % in Kasserine (21 %), Gafsa (28 %) and Tataouine (24 %), while the 
national average was 13 %. Regarding graduated unemployment, Gafsa (47 %), Sidi Bouzid (41 
%), Kebili (43 %) and Jendouba (40 %) recorded the highest rates much higher than the national 
average rate (23%). For poverty, the rate is ranged as follows: 7% in Tunis metropolitan, 18% in 
North-east, 20% in North West region, 25% in the south and 31% in the middle-east (ADB, 
2012). These rates show inequality and social exclusion between the regions under ex-deposed 
President’s regime.  
 
                                                          
1
 For more details see the 2012 report African Development Bank: Tunisie: Défis économiques et sociaux post-
révolution. ADB. Tunis.   
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These problems have intensified when ex-president Ben Ali and his extended family started 
controlling gradually the most important economic sectors in Tunisia: transport, 
telecommunication, aviation, banking sector, etc.  As the new businessmen and businesswomen 
have concentrated further their businesses in the coastal region, including Tunis, inequality and 
regional disparities have deepened. All these conditions increased the level of corruption in 
Tunisia and were considered as determining factors in the Tunisian revolution of 2011. 
According to the African Development Bank (ADB, 2012), despite Tunisia succeeded to reduce 
the rate of poverty, the disparity remains a challenge. 
 
For all these reasons we are aiming in this paper at investigating the dynamic relationship 
between corruption, investment and economic growth in Tunisia. This could explain the reason 
of the revolution and whether corruption has been stopped or not following the social uprising of 
December 2010. In the empirical section we use data span from 1976-2013 and we perform a 
vector error correction model and cointegartion technique to detect causality between the 
variables used in the model. To the best of our knowledge, the VECM approach has never been 
done to date to detect causality and cointegration relationship between the variables of our study. 
The main findings of this paper show that corruption hampered Tunisia economic growth in the 
short-run and the long run as well. Corruption could be the main reason of the slowdown of 
investment activities and the low inflow of capital during the recent period.   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 describe a literature review, second 3 
gives a glance at the propagation of corruption in Tunisia economy, section 4 provides the 
empirical results and finding while section 5 concludes.   
 
II. Literature Review 
During the past few decades, a growing number of studies have been carried out to examine the 
concept of corruption, its consequences, and the policy responses that could stop its rife. The 
pioneering theoretical work by Leff (1964) revealed an interesting link between corruption and 
economic growth. Since that, a huge amount of papers has been done to examine the economic 
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impact of corruption. Generally, the literature can be classified in two groups: corruption-growth 
and corruption-FDI. 
1.1. Corruption and Growth 
Literature on corruption-growth nexus reveals two conflicting results and thus it could be 
classified in to categories. The first one shows a positive impact of corruption on economic 
growth. Leff (1964) and Huntington (1968) show that corruption increases economic growth for 
a number of reasons including helping entrepreneurs to avoid bureaucratic delay by bribing 
officials. Lui (1965) suggests that corruption minimizes waiting costs thus reducing inefficiency 
in economic activity. Beck and Maher (1986) and Lien (1986) maintain that allocative efficiency 
can exist even where corrupt officials grant bids to the highest bidder.  
The second category opines that corruption negates economic growth as it increase the cost of 
business and introduces a significant uncertainty in the decision making process (Murphy et al, 
(1993), Gould and Amaro-Reyes (1983), United Nations (1990), Mauro (1995), Mo (2000), and 
Monte and Papagni (2001). Mauro (1995) demonstrated how corruption is negatively and 
significantly linked to GDP per capita growth rate for a cross-section of 58 countries for the 
period 1960-1985. Mo (2000) points out that corruption are beneficial to a specific group of 
people, mainly the elites and political affiliates and create unfairness in opportunities. 
Using four measures of corruption and four diﬀerent sets of cross country regressions for four 
diﬀerent time periods: 1980–83, 1988–92; 1984–96 and 1994–96, Rock and Bonnett (2004) 
tested the robustness of the negative effect of corruption on growth and investment. They found 
that corruption slows growth and/or reduces investment in most developing countries particularly 
small developing countries, but increases growth in the large East Asian newly industrializing 
economies.   
Based on a sample of 63 to 71 countries between 1970 and 1998 and using three data sets: 
macroeconomic data, corruption indices and govemance indicators, Meon and Sekkat (2005) 
found a significant negative impact of corruption on both investment and growth. This impact is 
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not only independent from corruption’s effect on investment but also tends to worsen as the 
quality of governance deteriorates.  
Svensson (2005) investigated eight questions on corruption. He finds a negative but not 
signivicative association between corruption and growth.  He used Mauro’s (1995) sample 
updated, during the period 1980-2000 and he performed the OLS regression and the fixed effect 
method. The result of his research indicates that the effect of corruption on development is not 
significant. He gives the example of China which has been able to grow fast while being ranked 
among the most corrupt countries.  
In their study on the effects of corruption on long-run growth, Mendez and Sepulveda (2006) 
incorporated measures of political freedom as a key determinant of the relationship. They find 
that corruption has a positive impact on long-run growth at low levels of incidence but is 
destructive at high levels. 
Fisman and Svensson (2007) tested the relationship between corruption and growth using a 
unique data set containing information on the estimated bribe payments of Ugandan firms. They 
found that there is a negative relationship between bribery rates and the short-run growth rates of 
Ugandan firms, and that the effect is much larger than the retarding effect of taxation over the 
period 1995–1997. The same result was found by Kimuyu (2007) for the Kenya context.  
The study of Aidt, Dutta and Sena (2008) offers theoretical and empirical investigation of the 
links between corruption, economic growth and institutional quality. They found two governance 
regimes. In the regime with high quality institutions, corruption is found to have a significant 
negative impact on growth while in the low quality instutional regime no corruption effect on 
growth is observed.  Meon and Weill (2008) analyzed the interaction between aggregate 
efficiency, corruption, and different dimensions of governance.  Their study is based on a panel 
of 69 countries, both developed and developing. They used two measures of corruption and two 
other aspects of governance. They report a detrimental effect of corruption in economies with 
effective institutions but where institutions are ineffective, there is a positive association between 
corruption and efficiency in economies. 
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Evrensel (2010) tested the corruption-growth and the corruption-growth volatility relationships. 
The cross-section sample used in this study covers 121 developed and developing countries2. The 
average growth rate of real GDP and the growth volatility are calculated based on the period 
1990-2000. The growth volatility is measured by the standard deviation of growth rates during 
the same period. Firstly, the empirical analysis reveals that higher corruption leads to higher 
growth rates. However, a higher representation of state-owned banks increases growth rates. 
Secondly, they find that higher government spending and lower risk control decrease growth 
rates. Finally, empirical findings indicate that openness and financial development have a 
positive effect on growth rates.   
 
Ugur and Dasgupta (2011) tested the relationship between corruption and economic growth. 
They found a negative relation between corruption and economic growth in poor income 
countries as well as in high income countries. For the case of Nigeria, Ajie and Wokekoro (2012) 
studied the effect of corruption on economic growth and found that corruption impedes 
economic growth.  
Dridi (2013) tested the relationship between corruption and economic growth cross-country data 
covering 82 countries, both developed and developing, over the period 1980-2002. Results 
indicate that in the presence of political instability, corruption negatively acts on the economic 
growth.  
Using meta-analysis, Ugur (2013) found a negative correlation between corruption and economic 
growth. In the same line of idea, Matthew and Idowu (2013) found that political corruption 
increases poverty as well as unemployment and negatively acts on economic growth. 
 
Saha and Gounder (2013), studied the relationship between income and corruption using recent 
data covering 100 countries and by regions and income classification for the period 1995 to 
2008. To explore the non-linear relationship, they performed linear, quadratic and cubic models. 
Their results indicate a negative relationship between income and corruption. 
                                                          
2
 Developed (31) and developing (90) countries.  
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Farooq et al. (2013) investigated the effect of corruption on economic growth in Pakistan. They 
have used time series data covering the period 1987-2009. By incorporating financial 
development and trade openness in growth model and applying structural break cointegration, 
their results indicate that corruption impedes economic growth. They also find that financial 
development adds in economic growth and trade openness stimulates economic growth. Those 
majors’ findings imply that the government must take measures to reduce the level of corruption 
via improving the governance in the country. Efficient governance leads to a low level of 
corruption which can be helpful in collecting tax revenues and increased tax revenue would be a 
fuel for development projects and hence economic growth. 
 
1.2. Corruption and investment 
Literature shows that corruption discourages investment (both internal and the foreign direct 
investment) because it increases the transaction costs of doing business, increases the uncertainty 
and increase the production cost (Mauro1995; Tanzi and Davoodi, 2002a).  
Mauro (1995) was the first who empirically analyzed the relationship between corruption and 
investment for a sample of 67 countries during the period 1980-1983. The index of corruption 
and the other institutional variables used in his paper were drawn from Business International 
(BI)3. In his paper Mauro (1995) restricts his analysis to nine indicators of institutional 
efficiency. He finds a negative and significant association between corruption and investment 
rate, both in OLS and 2SLS estimations. The results indicate that an improvement in the 
corruption index is associated with an increase in the investment rate by 2.9 percent. He 
demonstrates that high levels of corruption are associated with lower levels of investment as a 
share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). As an example, Mauro (1995) shows that “if 
Bangladesh (score of 4.7) were to improve the integrity and efficiency of its bureaucracy to the 
                                                          
3
 BI published indices on 56 “country risk” factors for 68 countries, for the period 1980-1983, and on 30 country 
risk factors for 57 countries, for the period 1971-1979. The BI indices are between 0 and 10 and a high value of the 
index means that the country in question has “good” institutions. 
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level of Uruguay (score of 6.8), its investment rate would increase by almost five percentage 
points and its yearly GDP growth would rise by over half a percentage point”. 
In another study based on US outward investment data, Hines (1995) does not find a negative 
correlation between total inward FDI and the corruption level in host countries. However, 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 actually weakens the competitive position and FDI 
growth of the American firms during 1977-1982, without significantly decreasing the importance 
of bribery to foreign business transactions. Wedeman (1997) tested the association between 
corruption and growth in Zaire, South Korea and Philippine and find that for countries with low 
corruption the correlation between corruption and the ratio of investment to GDP might be strong 
and it loses power for countries with higher levels of corruption.  
Wei (2000) studied the effect of corruption on foreign direct investment using a sample covered 
bilateral investment from twelve source countries to 45 host countries. He performed an OLS, 
quasi fixed effects, and Tobit estimation and finds that a rise in either the tax rate on 
multinational firms or the corruption level in a host country reduces inward foreign direct 
investment (FDI). He also finds that an increase in the corruption level from that of Singapore to 
that of Mexico would have the same negative effect on inward FDI as raising the tax rate by fifty 
percentage points. 
Habib and Zurawicki (2002) analyzed the relationship between corruption and FDI in a cross-
section of 89 developed and less developed countries and find that corruption tends to impede 
FDI. Akcay (2001) employed a cross sectional data from 52 developing countries with two 
different indices of corruption to estimate the effect of the level of corruption on FDI inflows. He 
performed an OLS with region dummies. The overall results fail to identify any significant effect 
of corruption on FDI. The most significant determinants of FDI are found to be:  the market size, 
corporate tax rates, labor costs and the openness of the economy.   
Tanzi and Davoodi (2002) have analyzed the relationship between corruption, public investment 
and growth. They have used indices or corruption from two sources: Business International (BI) 
and Political Risks Services (ICRG). Both indices assess the degree of corruption in a country. 
The IB index ranges 0 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt), while the ICRG index ranges 0 (most 
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corrupt) to 6 (least corrupt). Tanzi and Davoodi (2002) have multiplied the ICRG index by 10/6 
to get ascending indices from 0 to 10. They find that corruption can increase public investment 
while reducing its productivity. They have also found that higher corruption is associated with 
higher total expenditure on wages and salaries. Thus, corruption can reduce the quality of 
infrastructure which increases the cost of doing business for both government and private sector. 
Consequently, growth is negatively affected.  
The study of Egger and Winner (2003) has used a sample of 73 developed and less developed 
countries over the time period 1995-1999 to test the interaction between the level of corruption 
and FDI. Using a fixed effect and a Hausman–Taylor model, their result show a positive impact 
of the viability of contracts on FDI inflows and a positive and significant relationship between 
corruption and FDI. A high level of corruption is usually associated with an unfavorable 
institutional environment.  
In the Swedish context, Hakkala, Norbaack, and Svaleryd (2008) have used data of multinational 
firms in manufacturing industries compiled by the Research Institute of Industrial Economics 
(IUI).  By dividing FDI into three categories: horizontal, vertical, and export-platform FDI, they 
found that corruption has a differential impact on different types of FDI. They found that 
corruption has a statistically significant impact on vertical and horizontal FDI. Precisely, the 
finding reveals that more corruption raises vertical FDI, but reduces horizontal FDI.  
Barassi and Ying Zhou (2012) tested the relationship between corruption and FDI for a sample 
of 20 OECD countries and 52 developed and developing countries observed during the period 
1996-2003. They modelled the relationship between corruption and FDI using both parametric 
and non-parametric approaches. Their main findings show that the impact of corruption on FDI 
stock is different for the different quantiles of the FDI stock distribution. 
Gueorguieva and Malesky (2012) have used a novel empirical strategy, drawn from research in 
experimental psychology, to test the linkage between foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
corruption. They found a clear evidence of corruption during both registration and procurement 
procedures in Vietnam. The prevalence of corruption, however, is not associated with inflows of 
FDI.  
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III. Corruption in the Tunisian context 
Over the past few years, corruption has increased in Tunisia. According to Transparency 
International, Tunisia’s rank in the annual index of corruption perception fell from 33 in 1998 to 
77 on 2013. An examination of the most corrupted sectors in Tunisia reveals that the police are 
the most corrupted with a level of 51%4, followed by the parliament members and the 
government officers with a level of 32% and Judges and magistrates with 30% (WJP Rule of law 
index, 2012). The Tunisian financial sector was also characterized by some financial misconduct 
and has registered several proclamations of corruption. Tunisian businessmen affirmed that the 
best relation an investor can have is indubitably with a banker as personal relations can facilitate 
access to funding without constraints. However, obtaining loans without guarantees can increase 
the credit risk and affect the performance of the banking system as a whole. In this line of 
analysis, it is worth recalling that the rate of nonperforming loans in Tunisian banks stood at 19 
% during 2000s, which is a high level.  
The recent report by Freedom House indicates that Tunisia has recently witnessed a declining 
institutions as well as increasing monopolization of power and corruption by the ex- president.  
During the period under ex-President Ben Ali regime, corruption was widespread in Tunisia and 
bribery was common. According to Chrisafis (2011), one-third of the county’s economy being 
allegedly siphoned off by the ex-leader and his family. As an example, Ben Ali created early 90s 
a solidarity fund called 26-26 to collect donations and then using them for improving 
infrastructure of underdeveloped regions. However, it appears that money collected was used by 
Ben Ali’s family for their personal use like buying illegally real estates, boats, and even private 
jets5. Furthermore, the Trabelsi family (ex-President’s family-in-law) has worsened and 
widespread further the corruption in almost all the sector in Tunisia as they grip most of the 
sectors in the country. They also manipulated investment laws to further their own business 
                                                          
4
 The US Department of State (2010) attests that the police in Tunisia have frequently used their power to extort 
money from Tunisian citizens. 
5
 According to the World Bank (2013, p5), the seized assets included some 550 properties, 48 boats and yachts, 40 
stock portfolios, 367 bank accounts, and approximately 400 enterprises (not all of which operate in Tunisia). The 
confiscation commission estimates that the total value of these assets combined is approximately 13 billion USD, or 
more than one-quarter of Tunisian GDP in 2011. 
13 
 
interests. Recently, the World Bank reveals that among 600 000 enterprises in Tunisia,  220 of 
them6 were owned by Ben Ali, his wife, and the extended family realized 21% the total private 
sector profits during 1996-2010 while representing only 3% of the total companies. 
The influence of ex-president family has discouraged investors and has generated a drop of FDI 
inflows these recent years. The volume of the FDI in Tunisia declined of 32.2 % during the first 
11 months of year 2009. During year 2009, the FDI reached TND1.972 billion (USD1.528 
billion) against TND 2,999 billion (USD 2,324 billion) in 2008.  
 
In the graph 1 below we have used two sources of data on corruption. The first source is the 
Transparency International index (TI) and the second is the International Country Risk Guide 
(IRCG). The corruption perception index (CPI) provided by International Transparency (IT) is a 
ranking of countries according to the extent by which corruption is believed to exist. It was 
created in 1995 by Transparency International and ranks almost 200 countries on a scale of zero 
to 10, with zero indicating high levels of corruption and 10 indicating low levels. Developed 
countries typically rank higher than developing nations due to stronger regulations.  The ICRG 
index rates 140 countries each month on the basis of over 40 risk metrics affecting political, 
economic and financial risk, dating back to 1984 for most. The ICRG corruption index varies 
from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating higher corruption.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 These firms were confiscated in the aftermath of the Jasmin revolution. The full list of which is available from the 
Ministry of Finance. 
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Graph 1: Evolution of the corruption perception index in Tunisia 1985-2013 
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Sources: International Country Risk Guide and Transparency International index 
 
Graph1 reveals a clear and a continuous downward trend in the TI index from 1998 to 2013 what 
confirms the increase of the corruption in Tunisia. The corruption perception index takes a value 
of 2.80 on 2012 while it was 5 on 1998. Those values indicate that the level of corruption in 
Tunisia increased during this period especially after the “Jasmin revolution” of December 2010 
as it moved from 3.8 in 2011 to 2.8 in 2012 and 1.9 for 2013.  As for the IRCG index, it recorded 
various trajectories during the period of the study: a constant tendency during 1985-2000 in 
which the level of corruption was about 3, then downward trends during 2000-2009 and 2012-
2013 in which corruption recorded a level of 2 for the first period and 2.5 for the second. Finally, 
there is an upward trend during the period 2010-2011 in which the ICRG index reached again 3.  
The most important remark to be drawn from graph 1 is the intersection of the two curves in 
2012. In spite of the different methodology of the two indices, they succeed to get almost the 
same value in 2012 with 2.5 for ICRG and 2.8 for TI. 
According to Transparency International and the World justice project and the Rule of law index, 
the level of corruption in Tunisia has increased during the last decade as it shifted from the place 
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33 in 1998 to 73 among 183 countries in 2011 and 77 among 177 countries on 2013 (Graph 2). 
An examination of the most corrupted sectors in Tunisia reveals that the police sector is the most 
corrupted with a level of 51%, followed by the parliament members and the State employees of 
the national government with a level of 32%. In the last rank, we find Judges and magistrates 
with 30%.  
Graph2. Evolution of the Corruption Perception Index 
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Source: authors using data from TI & WJP Rule of law index 
Despite the decline of the Tunisian international position, Tunisia was better ranked in 2009 than 
its neighbors notably; Egypt (111), Algeria (111) and Morocco (89).  In 2010, Algeria continues 
to be ranked at the top of Arab countries in the corruption perception index with a value of 105 
in 2010 and 112 in 2011 while Egypt and Morocco were ranked 98 and 85 respectively in 2010 
and 112 and 80 in 2011 (World justice project and the Rule of law index, 2013).  
In 2013, Tunisia lost two steps in the last world ranking regarding its efforts for fighting 
corruption and it was ranked 77th out of 177 countries. However, Tunisia keeps the same score of 
41 points as that of the previous years and Tunisia is ranked first in Maghreb and the 8th in the 
Arabic scale. 
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IV. Econometric Methodology 
 
Our investigation is to test whether corruption hampered economic growth and the macro-
economy o Tunisia.  The basic empirical investigation has two purposes.  The first one is to 
examine the long-run relationship corruption and economic growth while the second is to 
examine the short-run dynamic causal relationship between the different variables.  The basic 
testing procedure requires three steps.  The first step is to test whether the variables contain a unit 
root to confirm the stationarity of each variable.  This is done by using the Augmented Dickey–
Fuller tests (F-ADF) and Philips–Perron (PP) tests.  For a robustness check, we also use the 
Zivot and Andrews (1992) unit root test with unknown structural break. In the second step we 
test for the existence of a long-run cointegrating relationship between the variables.  This is done 
by the use of the Johansen-Fisher methods.  Finally, the last step, if all variables are integrated of 
order one I(1) and cointegrated short-run elasticities can be computed using the vector error 
correction model (VECM) method suggested by Engle and Granger (1987).  
4.1. Data  
 
The empirical model includes the following four variables: real foreign direct investment inflows 
(FDI) to GDP, gross fixed capital formation to GDP as a proxy of investment (INV), total credit 
to the private sector (CPS). For economic growth we used GDP per capita as it was argued that it 
is considered as important determinant of the level of corruption. The main source of our data is 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).  
Following previous studies by Knack and Keefer (1995); Tanzi and Davoodi (1997); Wei 
(2000); and Mendez and Speulveda (2006), data on corruption was extracted from International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The ICRG corruption index varies from 0 to 6, where lower value 
implies higher corruption. Lower corruption scores indicate that “high government officials are 
likely to demand special payments” and that “illegal payments are generally expected throughout 
lower levels of government” in the form of “bribes connected with import and export licenses, 
exchange controls, tax assessment, policy protection, or loans” (see Knack and Keefer, 1995, p. 
225).  
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The time series data is recorded annually; it covers the period from 1976 to 2013.  The data are 
yearly, and cover the period 1976-2013. All the variables are transformed into log form to reduce 
the problem of heteroscedasticity.   
The correlation coefficients and descriptive statistics for the major variables are summarized in 
Table 1. Credit to private sector and FDI are found to have a positive correlation with growth 
while investment and corruption are both negatively correlated with per capita income growth. 
Furthermore, the correlation matrix reveals the negative correlation between corruption and the 
other variables.  
Regarding the coefficients, they are considered as low which reflect absence of autocorrelation 
between the variables of the study.  
Table 1. Statistical table and the correlation matrix 
 LGDPPC LINV LCPS LCOR LFDI 
 Mean  7.468825  3.200391  4.136842  0.974186  0.694334 
 Median  7.459339  3.170861  4.106767  1.098612  0.717840 
 Maximum  7.832808  3.774369  4.410371  1.098612  2.242835 
 Minimum  7.115582  2.989714  3.940222  0.693147 -0.510826 
 Std. Dev.  0.254917  0.133632  0.117175  0.182514  0.700823 
 Jarque-Bera  2.625648  156.7220  2.261253  5.145477  0.584729 
 Observations  29  29  29  29  29 
LGDPPC 1     
LINV -0.14182 1    
LCPS 0.362972 0.1545964 1   
LCOR -0.64368 - 0.19448290 -0.0931844 1  
LFDI 0.6454416 0.2654227   0.2264587 -0.552486 1 
Note. LGDPpc is the real GDP per capita; LINV is the ratio of investment to GDP, LCPS is the credit to the private 
sector as a share of GDP, LCOR, the corruption index, LFDI is the foreign direct investment inflows as a percentage 
of GDP, L is the logarithm.  
 
4.2.  Econometric approach  
4.2.1. Unit root testing and Structural Break 
We employ the Augmented Dickey–Fuller (F-ADF) unit root tests to identify whether the 
variables contain a unit root and confirm the stationarity of each variable.  Common criticisms of 
these tests include sensitivity to the way the test is conducted, such that the wrong version of the 
ADF test is used.  ADF tests are also quite sensitive to any incorrect establishment of lag 
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parameter.  Given this weakness, we also conduct the Phillips-Perron (PP) test (1988), which 
allows for the presence of a non-zero mean and a deterministic time trend. 
 
As we have presented in the introduction, the Tunisian economy has been subject to a various 
numbers of economic reforms during the period 1980-2010. Hence, one could conclude that 
macroeconomic variables are likely to have been subject to a structural break, such as that from 
the structural adjustment programs in 1987 or the revolution of 2010. In this case, the common 
ADF and PP unit root tests could not provide reliable results. In fact, the ADF and PP unit root 
tests are known to suffer  potentially severe size distortions in finite samples when errors are 
serially correlated, especially when the errors are of the moving average type with a root 
approaching minus one (Haldrup and Jansson, 2005). To overcome these problems many 
economists insist on the necessity of including breakpoint that can be determined from the data. 
The debate was initially developed by Perron (1989) who revealed the critical importance of 
modeling structural breaks when carrying out unit root tests. Hence, Perron suggested allowing 
for an exogenous structural break in the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests as a solution to 
increase the power of ADF tests. Following this development, Zivot and Andrews (1992) and 
later Perron (1997) suggested an alternative method for detecting structural break by allowing for 
an endogenous or an unknown break point. In this paper we use the Zivot and Andrews (1992) 
unit root test that allows for endogenous structural breaks which is important since it prevents a 
data dependent arbitrary choice of the break point.  
 
The test of the Zivot and Andrews (1992) consists in solving the following three types of models.  
The first model (A) considers a one-time change in the intercept of the variables of the 
underlying data. Arithmetically, the model is written as follows:  
Model (A):  ∑
=
−−
+∆++++=
k
j
tjttAtAAtAAt yytDUy
1
,1 εωλβθα                               (1)  
The second model (B) allows for a one-time structural break in the slope of the trend function. It 
is expressed as follows:   
Model (B):
 
∑
=
−−
+∆++++=
k
ij
tjtjBtBtBBt yyDTty B εωλφγβα ,1)(                         (2)  
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The third model (C) allows for a one-time structural break in the intercept and trend all together.   
Model (C): ∑
=
−−
+∆+++++=
k
j
tjtjCttCtCt yyDTtDUy CCC
1
,1)()( εωλφγβφθα      (3)  
 
where, Td /=φ is the unknown sample ratio to be estimated [ ])/)1(,/2( TTT −=∏∈φ , T is the 
number of observations and d is the unknown breakpoint. 
DU is a dummy varibale which is as follows: 
)(φtDU  = 1 if  t > φT  
                
= 0 otherwise; 
 DT is the slope dummy written as:  
φφ TtDTt −=)(  if φTt >  
              = 0 otherwise.  
The nul hypothesis of a unit root test is that ,
 
1
,
=φλi  , i= A,B,C. Every model has a unit root 
with a break under the null hypothesis, as the dummy variable is incorporated in the regression 
under the null. The alternative hypothesis is a broken trend stationary process.  Following Zivot 
and Andrews (1992), we fixed the trimming region to be at 0.15T, 0.85T and then we choose the 
breakpoint date according to the given value of the break date.  
 
4.2.2. Cointegration  
The cointegration test is based on the multivariate Johansen approach (1988) which uses two 
statistic tests, namely:  Trace test and Max-Eigen value.  The likelihood Ratio (LR) test is based 
on the trace statistics ( λ trace) which tests the H0: qr ≤ against H1: rq =  is calculated thus: 
∑
+
−−=
p
l
trace iTr
1
)ˆ1ln()( λλ  where ir +λ …. nλ , are the least value of eigenvectors )( rp − .  The 
second test is the maximal eigenvalue test )( maxλ which tests the H0: there are r cointegrating 
vectors against the H1: there are 1+r cointegrating vectors and is calculated as follows:  
)1ˆ1ln()1,(max +−−=+ rTrr λλ . 
20 
 
While numerous papers have used bivariate and trivariate frameworks to test for causality 
between corruption and economic growth, in this paper we use multivariate procedure by the 
mean of a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM).    
 
The VECM is now specified as follows: 
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(8) 
Where ECT is expressed as follows:  
ititititt LCorLINVLCPSLFDILGdppcECT −−− −−−−−= 4211 3. ββββα  (9) 
 Where t=1...T, denotes the time period.    
 
A major advantage of VECM is that it can also be used to verify causality among the variables in 
case of cointegrated series.  Although cointegration indicates the presence of causality, yet the 
direction of causality amongst the variables is identified through VECM.  Moreover, one can 
21 
 
also distinguish between the short- and long-run causality with the help of vector error correction 
model (Hamdi and Sbia 2013). 
 
4.2. Empirical results 
4.2.1. Unit root tests and Structural Break 
The results of the unit root tests of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) 
for the four variables of the model are presented in Table 1.  The test statistics for the log levels 
are statistically insignificant.  The results show that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected in each 
series in the level where the series contain a unit root.  Therefore, LGDP, LFDI, LCPS, LINV and 
LCor appear to be non-stationary in the level.  By testing through first difference, the results 
clearly indicate that the null hypothesis of non-stationary can be rejected.  This means that 
LGDP, LFDI, LEXPORT and LINV become stationary and do not contain unit root after first 
differencing at the 1 per cent level of significance.  Hence, from all of the tests, the unit roots 
tests indicate that each variable is integrated of order one. 
 
Table 1. Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) Unit root tests 
  
  
                     ADF                PP Order of 
Integration Level 1st diff, Level 1st diff, 
LGDP 0.481 -5.271*** 0.481 -5.2753*** I(1) 
LFDI -1.309 -6.818*** -1.193 -6.7805*** I(1) 
LINV -1.358 -10.435*** -2.054 -11.119*** I(1) 
LCPS -2.2855 -11.9253*** -2.3940 -11.9340*** I(1) 
LCor  -1.73 -5.017*** -1.736 -5.04*** I(1) 
 
The results of Zivot-Andrews unit root test are reported in Table-2. The Zivot-Andrews test with 
one structural break finds no additional evidence against the unit root null hypothesis relative to 
the unit root tests without a structural break. In other words, in models A, B and C the null 
hypotheses are not rejected for the variables. This result is consistent with the standard ADF and 
PP test results.  
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Table-2: Zivot-Andrews Structural Break Unit Root Test 
Variable  Model A Model B Model C 
   T-statistic                          Time Break    T-statistic         Time Break    T-statistic                          Time Break 
LGDP -3.55   (1) 1999 -4.06 (1) 2009 -4.12 (2) 2007 
LFDI -5.832 (2) 1992 -5.02 (2) 1994 -5.65 (2)      1994 
LINV -4.653 (4) 1998 -4.22 (3) 1999 -5.67 (3) 1992 
LCPS -4.873 (3) 1989 -5.04 (2) 1990 -4.94 (1) 1989 
LCor  -4.126 (1) 2002 -5.56 (1) 1998 -5.39(1) 2001 
Note. Critical values for rejection of null hypothesis of a unit root with a structural break for the three models). 
*Denotes significance at the 10 percent level. Lag order is shown in parenthesis. 
Overall our results report that all the series have same level of integration i.e. I(1). 
According to Engle and Granger (1987), variables with the same order of integration can be 
tested for cointegration.  In this way, the result from the unit root test facilitated us in proceeding 
to the cointegration test for the variables under study. 
4.2.2.  Cointegration and Granger causality analysis  
The purpose of the cointegration test is to identify whether it exists a long run relationship 
between the LGDPpc. FDI, LCPS,  LINV and LCor Table 5 presents the results of the trace and 
the maximum-eigenvalue tests from the Johansen (1980) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) 
maximum Likelihood analysis.  The results suggest the existence of one cointegrating vectors at 
5% of significance. 
 Table 3. Results for Johansen test cointegration 
Hypothesized Trace Statistic Max-Eigen  Statistic 
       None * 103.7594 52.71273 
At most 1 * 51.04665   21.95184 
At most 2 29.09481 14.68254 
At most 3 14.41227 8.703758 
At most 4 5.708512  5.708512 
 Trace and Max-eigenvalue test indicates1cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
The results of the long-run equilibrium relationship are presented in Table 4 below. The most 
important variable in the model, which is corruption, acts positively and significantly at the level 
of 1% to economic growth7.  The coefficient of corruption reported estimates is 0.423. This 
                                                          
7
 It is worth recalling that a decrease in the  corruption index  means an increase in corruption and vice versa.  
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should be interpreted as follows: a one-unit increase in perceived corruption (index) is associated 
with a decrease in per capita GDP growth rate of 0.42.percentage points. Indubitably, corruption 
weighted immensely on growth and our results suggest that improvement in corruption 
engenders economic growth. This result is in line with most of the studies on corruption and 
growth nexus.  
The coefficient of credit to the private sector ( CPS ) is positive and significant at a level of1%. 
This conclusion indicates that credit to private sector is an important engine of economic growth.  
Facilitating credit conditions, by reducing for example constraints to access to finance, would 
improve the well-being of Tunisian households (Hamdi et al 2013). If we consider CPS as a 
proxy of financial development, then we can conclude that this result is in line with the 
traditional literature on finance and growth (Aghion et al., 2005; Levine, 2005; Levine et al., 
2000). The coefficient of foreign direct investment ( FDI ) is positive and significant at 1% level 
of significance. This is a very important conclusion that shows that the massive reforms 
implemented in late 80s and early 90s have been fruitful for economic growth in the long term as 
they were aimed at attracting massive foreign investment. From this result we can conclude that 
FDI led to growth in Tunisia in the long run and this result confirm the recent study by Hamdi et 
al (2013).  
The ratio of investment to GDP is negative and significant at the 1 percent level.  The magnitude 
of the coefficient implies that a 1 percent decrease in investment to GDP ratio increases real 
GDP by 3.35 percent. According to Mauro (1995) corruption affect growth through reducing the 
investment activities.  Our result is in line with the findings by Hamdi et al. (2013) for the 
Tunisian context.  
Table 3. Long-run elasticities 
Dependent Variable: LGDPpc 
Regressors Coefficients T-Value 
LCOR 0.423827 -3.63023*** 
LINV -3.354228 15.0807*** 
LFDI 0.428948 -10.0858*** 
LCPS 0.484617 -1.51672** 
C 15.48598 
Note: ***, **and * indicate the rejection of null-hypothesis at 1%, 5% and10% significance levels, respectively. 
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The results of the short-run estimations are presented in table 4.  In fact, since the optimal lag 
length was two, the short-run results are also presented for two lags of each variable.  These 
results seem interesting in the sense that corruption has a positive impact on growth in the short 
run and the coefficient is significant at 5% level of significance.  This means that in the short-
run, corruption hampered significantly per capita GDP and an improvement of the corruption 
index would improve GDPpc.  FDI have a negative impact on Tunisian economy.   
 
In the same line of analysis, investment contributed positively and significantly at the level of 
5% to economic growth.  This result could surprise but it is not surprising that multiplying 
investment activities and projects, especially public, encourage high level officials to get bribes 
(Tanzi and Davoodi 1997). Therefore, public investment is the best way to get dirty money.  
It is also evident from table 4 that error correction term is statistically significant and has the 
expected sign.  The coefficient -0.069 indicates that when GDP per capita is above or below its 
equilibrium level, it adjusts by 6.9% within the first year. Therefore, the pace of adjustment 
toward the equilibrium is low in case of any shock to GDP.  
Table 4.  ECM results based on Johansen cointegration  
Error Correction: Coefficient t-value 
∆ LINV(1)  0.141323  1.64559** 
∆ LINV(2)  0.065054  1.68489* 
∆ LFDI(1) -0.014447 -1.80548** 
∆ LFDI(2) -0.007695 -0.90783 
∆ LCPS(1)  0.074559  0.75025 
∆ LCPS(2)  0.052798  0.59114 
∆ LCOR(1) 0.096514 -2.86070** 
∆ LCOR(2) 0.038727 -0.8914 
C  0.018458 1.8486 
ECT -0.069934 -3.35559*** 
Diagnostic tests t-stats p-value 
White Test 1.5696 0.2112 
Normality  1.4535 0.4834 
Serial Correlation LM Test 0.1137 0.8934 
ARCH 0.8554 0.4519 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 1.6522 0.1865 
R2 0.677 
Note: ***, **and * indicate the rejection of null-hypothesis at 1%, 5% and10% significance levels, respectively. 
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For a stability purpose, we have conducted several diagnostic tests to the ECM model.  The 
results are reported in the lower part of Table 4.  They confirm the absence of serial correlation 
(Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test), heteroskedasticity (White Test) and 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) in the model.  The underlying model also 
passes diagnostic test for normality (Jacque-Bera). 
 
The stability of the model was also checked by applying cumulative sum of recursive 
residual (CUSUM) and cumulative sum of squares of recursive residual (CUSUMQ) techniques 
based on ECM of Eq.(5).  They show that the model is stable. We did not provide the CUSUM 
and CSUMSQ figures to save space, but they are available from the authors upon request 
 
Figure1. CUSUM and CUSUM SQ 
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After examining the dynamics of long and short-run estimations, we turn to investigate the 
direction of causality between the variables of the model.  This is done by the use of three 
Granger causality tests: short-run causality, long-run causality and the joint short and long run. 
The results are reported in table 5.   
 
Table 5.  Direction of Granger causality tests 
 
 
Varia
ble 
 
Short run (F-stats) 
ECT 
(t-stat 
 
Joint short and long run (F-stats) 
∆LGDP ∆LFDI ∆LCPS ∆LINV ∆LCor  ∆LGDP 
& ECT 
 ∆LFDI 
& ECT 
∆LCPS
& ECT 
∆LInv  
& ECT 
∆LCor 
& ECT 
   
∆LGD
P 
- 0.163*
* 
 
3.113** 
 
0.661 
 
3.202**
* 
 
-
3.118*
** 
- 0.312 
 
2.912
* 
 
0.689 
 
1.749 
∆LFDI 1.616 - 2.839** 1.019 - 1.4556 1.242 0.979 - 3.148
** 
1.749 1.09 
∆LCPS 0.49** 4.756*
* 
- 0.209* - 0.588 2.314 2.975*
* 
5.277*
** 
- 2.711* 1.110 
∆LInv 1.249 1.073 0.157 - -
1.810** 
-
1.517*
* 
1.979* 1.131 0.135 - 2.225*
* 
∆LCor no 1.749 1.749 1.749 - -
0.129* 
10225 0.529 1.92* 2.002* - 
 
The results of VECM Granger causality approach provide long-and short run relationships 
between the variables.  
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In long run, the feedback hypothesis exists between corruption and economic growth. The 
bidirectional causal relationship is found between Credit to private sector and foreign direct 
investment and the same is true for economic growth and CPS. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that corruption exerts significant control on growth and investment in the short-run and this 
implies that corruption has overbearing and predictive power in the Tunisia economy. 
 
For short span of time, bidirectional causality is found between economic growth and corruption. 
The feedback hypothesis also exists between corruption and financial development. Trade 
openness and corruption are not interdependent. Finally, unidirectional causality is found 
running from financial development to economic growth. The joint long-and-short run analysis 
confirms the long run and short run causality relationships between the variables such as 
economic growth, corruption, financial development and FDI.  
 
4.3.3. Impulse response functions 
 
We use impulse response functions (IRFs), which outline the dynamic response of a one-
standard-deviation shock in a variable on current and future values of the variables, in order to 
capture the short-run dynamics of the model. It can also provide information on the period by 
which variables go back to the equilibrium following a shock in the long run relationship. 
Since the IRFs based on a Cholesky decomposition is influenced by the ordering of the variables, 
we applied generalized impulse response functions (GIRFs) proposed by Pesaran and Shin 
(1998). The impulse response functions (IFRs) is presented in Figure 2 below.  
 
The chart illustrates the response of each variable of the VAR and the impact of other variables. 
It shows that the response of GDPpc to corruption is negative for almost all the coming ten 
periods. Once again, this reveals the harmful impact of corruption on growth and development.  
 
The impulse response functions also reveals the positive feedback of gdp following a shock from 
credit to private sector and this support our previous finding regarding the positive association 
between financial deepening and economic growth if we consider CPS as a proxy of financial 
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development. Similarly, FDI appears to impact positively economic growth as its sharp remains 
positive during all the coming years. Finally, it also appears from the shocks that the relation of 
investment with the other variables is not clear and cannot justify a positive feedback. In this 
case, one could confirm the one of the channel through which corruption affect growth is 
investment activities as all projects are public and high officers request a bribe to get the license.  
 
Overall, from Fig. 2, we conclude that the responses are significant and the short run equilibrium 
adjustment process is fairly fast.  
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Figure2. Impulse response functions 
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V.  Conclusion and policy implications 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the dynamic relationship between corruption and 
economic growth for the case of Tunisia by incorporating credit to the private sector, investment 
to GDP ratio and foreign direct investment inflow to GDP. The study covers the data period of 
1976 to 2013. In the empirical model, we have firstly used a unit root test with structural break to 
test the stationary properties of the series and the cointegration for long-run is investigated by 
applying the vector error correction procedure.  The study makes several important findings. 
First, the results reveal that a one-unit increase in corruption retards economic growth by roughly 
0.423 percent for the period under consideration. The finding that corruption has negative 
influence on economic growth is consistent with almost all the available studies. The results 
suggest that improvement in corruption engenders economic growth. The second important 
conclusion is the negative association between investment and growth suggesting that investment 
is an important channel through which corruption could be transmitted. This result is in line with 
the one found by Mauro (1995).  
The paper reveals two other important results. The first one is the positive association between 
credit to the private sector and GDPpc suggesting a validation of finance-led-growth for the case 
of Tunisia if we take CPS as a proxy for growth. The second important conclusion is the positive 
association between FDI with GDPpc in the short-run and long-run as well. This result confirms 
the previous studies on FDI-led-growth for the case of Tunisia (Hamdi et al 2013, Belloumi 
2014). The third important conclusion is that unfortunately, corruption gets worsened in the 
period that follows the social turmoil. Hence, the three post-revolution governments did not 
successfully limit corruption rife.   
 
Based on the findings of this study it is obvious that corruption appears to be one of the serious 
obstacles to economic growth and social development in Tunisia. Hence, efforts should be made 
to curtail all kind of corruption. The current and forthcoming Tunisian governments have to do 
more efforts to fight corruption by implementing new rules and laws which aim at reducing 
corruption and encourage transparency. 
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